This is an issue that I am very interested in, and that I hope to get the opportunity to explore & write about again as there are so many different things that can be written about it. For the purposes of this blog, I decided that instead of giving a brief synopsis on the issue, I would post a research paper that I wrote for one of my classes.
The Privatization of Security: A New Breed of Transnational CorporationsThe rise of private military contractors in the last decade has ushered an era where the traditional sovereign power of the state to control force has been diluted. Max Weber’s view of a state’s capacity to “successfully claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” is now a concept that seems to become eroded in light of the privatization of security.
1 No longer are states the only legitimate vehicles by which trained military forces can be deployed. Private security companies, offering a wide array of military services that includes “military training, preparing meals for soldiers, driving supply trucks, acting as security guards and conducting interrogations in detention facilities,” are now an alternative and efficient means to replenish a shortage of manpower.
2They also come pre-equipped with their own weaponry obtained from the international arms trade; thus, a state no longer needs to be the only legitimate bearer of arms.
3 In essence, private military contractors (PMCs) function as aggregate units of corporate military power at the disposal of any state willing to contract their services. War is the capitalizing business instrument for these modern private security firms.
4The surging of the private security sector has been fueled by post-Cold war governmental downsizing, free market philosophy and resurging world conflict.
5 Like multinational corporations of today, private security firms are indeterminately linked to the transnational market that pushes for its demand.
6 The “disintegration of weak states” and the need for greater military assistance create the favorable environmental conditions employment for PMCs.
7 Moreover, opportunities for competitive pay have replaced conventional nationalistic feelings for enlisting in the army.
8 Where the individual was drawn to the glorification of war he/she is now drawn to the glorification of profit.
Furthermore, the introduction of a new actor in the security realm of conflict and war presents new challenges about how non-state actors can be held accountable for violations of human rights. Traditionally, the Geneva Conventions and its respective protocols govern the actions of state military personnel in times of war for the protection of humanitarian international law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 clearly hold state signatories accountable for upholding its provisions relative to the treatment of prisoner of war in declaring that:
“High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention .”
9In other words, whenever there is a breech violation of human rights the state is responsible for punishing its respective nationals. And in times of war, to a state, military tribunals become the conventional means by which to try combatants for breeches in the Geneva Convention.
In terms of the Geneva Convention, private military contractors can be derived to be outlawed under the category of mercenaries.
10 Nonetheless, careful attention must be paid to the way in which the article defines a mercenary, and the applicability of such a definition to private military contractors today. According to Article 47 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 a mercenary is:
“persons recruited for armed conflict who are motivated essentially by the desire for private gain and are promised material compensation substantially in excess promised or paid to combatants in the armed forces of that party.”
11The key phrase in Article 47 is “persons recruited for armed conflict.”
12 In other words, since PMCs are not always directly involved in combat, providing other technical means of warfare such as military training or interrogation services, it leaves open the continual possibility of PMCs to argue that they do not constitute mercenaries.
13 Thus, PMCs are able to circumvent international law over matters of definition. To eliminate the possibility that contractors escape responsibility for their crimes, this paper will use the term mercenary or PMC interchangeably to designate any individual who engages in any aspect of security services from providing combatants and arms to providing intelligence services.
Another issue associated with accountability has been the lack of oversight by states that employ or harbor contractors. States may hire a private security firm but do not follow on prosecuting individual members of that firm for violating conventional rules of war. PMCs have a “diffusive” characteristic that ultimately undermines responsibility among a corporate spectrum.
14 In other words, just like in cases where the state is unable to designate whether a fellow soldier or his commander is at fault for committing a crime, a contractor is able to point to his hierarchical chain of command and diffuse culpability. Hence, like in international law, PMCs are able to bypass punishment for their crimes because there is no effective system to hold them accountable.
In light of these issues, it is imperative that the international community along with states devise a way in which private military contractors can be held accountable for violating humanitarian law. Just as transnational corporations like UNOCAL have been held responsible for the atrocities they partake in, private security firms can be held accountable for their crimes. Privatized security can no longer stand in the mists of the grey area in international affairs without any legislative accountability.
With the impeding problems that private security firms present to the preservation of international humanitarian law, it is also crucial to analyze the implications and challenges that such security firms have presented through a historical as well as modern perspective. Thus, the focus of this paper is on two case studies that illustrate the wide use of private military contractors. The first presents an analysis of the role of South-African based firm Executive Outcomes in the Sierra Leone conflict. The second case study offers a current overview of the use of private security firms in the Iraq War. Such case studies will represent a gateway for outlining policy implications and presenting a solution to state and international accountability of private military contractors. On a final note, the favorable prospects of bringing transparency to private security firms will be noted.
Historical Perspective
The origins of mercenaries, reminiscent of the private military contractors of today, are traced back to three thousand years ago even before the development of the state system.
15 In fact, Deborah Avant underlines how “before the rise of the state, market allocation of force [private] prevailed and virtually all force was allocated.”
16 In other words, force was control by the private sector; thus, it could be sold as a commodity. For example, military contractors would often employ forces that had been trained in feudal structures and lease them out to local elites who were willing to pay for such services.
17 Like PMCs today, they recognized the profit of selling their security services. With the advent of the state system, however, there was a demise of the private sector of security to the state.
Moreover, historically, the allure of mercenary life has been contingent on the monetary compensation that such an occupation entails. A mercenary does not join a war for direct nationalistic purposes but because he/she is driven by material rewards.
18 Similarly, military personnel today are driven to work for private security firms because they will be paid considerable amounts of money. For example, Executive Outcomes, a former private security firm in Sierra Leone, paid its employees up to $6000 monthly to conduct air strikes to push away the rebel forces.
19It is interesting to note that with the rise of globalization and debates about the centrality of the state in an era of ever increasing interdependence that the private security sector should resurface again. There is no doubt that there are central connections between PMCs and globalization. Private security firms rely on a liberalized global market that allows their services to be sold at a transnational level without direct government interference.
20 Privatization is also in a large part pushed by the belief that such a policy offers “traditional cost savings” in globalize era.
21 Although the rise of private security firms appears to be new in modern times, it is not new historically. What states are witnessing is effectively the resurgence of the private security sector.
Executive Outcomes
Executive Outcomes (EO) created in 1989 by Eben Barlow, a retired South African intelligence officer, was one of the most predominant private security firms before its demise in 1999.
22 It conducted its operations from South Africa and provided services such as “advisory training, sniper training, combat air patrol, medical aid and armed special forces.”
23 Executive Outcomes was propelled to the forefront as a private security firm when it was hired by the Strasser government to protect the Sierra Ruitile diamond mining areas as well as to defeat the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel forces in Sierra Leone in March of 1995.
24 The Strasser government promised Executive Outcomes 15 billion dollars for its services along with diamond mining concessions for their services.
25Although Executive Outcomes had only 150 troops upon its arrival in Sierra Leone, it was able to quickly defeat the RUF forces and secure the diamond mining areas.
26 It must be noted though that the primary reason for EOs services was to ensure the protection of the diamond industry. Thus, civilian protection was of minimal concern to the company.
27When there was a resurgence of RUF rebel attacks, EO strategically refueled ethnic strives within the local village people known as the Kamajors to destroy the RUF base.
28 The EO trained the Kamajors and supplied them with the necessary weapons to stop the advancing RUF forces.
29 EOs military tactics worked so well that “within ten months the mercenary army secured peace in a nation whose extreme violence had proven immune to previous forces such as the UN and OAU.”
30Nonetheless, when Strasser was overthrown by Tejan Kabbah, his defense leader, Executive Outcomes saw their monetary compensation dwindling further down. The new leader of Sierra Leone, was unaware of the deal made between Strasser and EO until he came into power: thus, of the $30.5 billion initially promised, EO received only $15 billion.
31 In light of such circumstances, Executive Outcomes withdrew from Sierra Leone in February of 1997.
32The Sierra Leone case with its primary use of a private security firm to achieve stability clearly illustrates how important privatized security has become to countries in conflict. Executive Outcomes provided the government with the military expertise to train and supply arms to its state military.
33 Without the help of EO, minimal stability to hold state elections would not have been possible in the country.
Also, the case illustrates how a security firm could affect the political stability of a state by empowering ethnic minorities. Soon after EO trained and supplied arms to the Kamajors, they become a political contester in Sierra Leone.
34 The local chiefs of the Kamajors helped to further destabilize control of the central government through their enhanced power.
35 In essence, EO became a stronger influential political agent than the state because they were directly influencing the power of neighboring actors. Consequently, serious questions must be raised when a private military firm begins to act as a state entity. Ultimately, a state must be aware that it gives away some of its fundamental sovereign powers of control when it hires a private military contractor to fight its wars.
Iraq War; Contractors Galore
The war on terrorism has propelled some of the most extensive use of private military contractors by the United States government. It is estimated that as of March 2006 there are 181 private security companies with over 48, 000 employees working in Iraq.
36 And anyone tuned into the Iraq War remembers the images of the body of two men dangling underneath the bridge of the Euphrates River in March of 2004.
37 Those two men were actually contractors part of the private security firm Blackwater.
38 Besides suffering casualties themselves, PMCs have also been responsible for innumerous deaths in Iraq. Yet, though they are widely employed by the US, they have had the luxury to stand immune from most of their crimes. Incidentally, the rise in the use of these private warriors has re-directed the need to hold them responsible for violations of human rights as well as shifted attention as to why the United States has bought the services of private security firms.
So why turn to the private sector? Faced with military downsizing and strained military assets, in PMCs the United States has found a way to outsource conflict at a monetary price.
39 Hungry PMC eager to bolster their financial assets are willing to supply all resources necessary no matter where their services are contracted to. In fact, a single contract with United States can land a PMC in Iraq up to $293 million.
40 Moreover, since PMCs are well aware that the US government has minimal oversight of their activities, they are left free to conduct business irrespective of international law.
In Iraq alone PMCs offer a wide range of services in Iraq including: providing intelligence gathering, conducting interrogations, training the Iraqi police and US army, protecting US personnel and guarding federal buildings.
41 Essentially, they cover all the services that a regular US army would without the accountability factor. Consequently, this has led to a wide spectrum of human rights abuses in Iraq.
For example, Amnesty International has reported that there are 20 known cases where contractors have violated human rights when handling detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan and only 1 case has been prosecuted so far.
42 Similarly, the Los Angeles Times conducted a survey and found that out 11 percent of 200 serious incidents filed by PMCs included firing toward “Iraqi civilian vehicles.”
43 When asked why PMCs where shooting at civilian vehicles, the common respond was that they appear to constitute a threat.
44 In essence, then PMCs function independently of all common rules of war and are free to target to civilians over any suspicion. What is worse is that the contractors are “immune from Iraqi courts” and the United States government has not sought to prosecute contractors of criminal activity.
45Additionally, new reports have been surfacing that link PMC involvement in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal.
46 CACI and BCG are two PMCs that provided intelligence interrogators at the Abu Ghraib prison, and it was found that 35% of these interrogators had no formal training in proper methods of interrogation.
47 No formal training clearly demonstrates why some of the harshest interrogation methods were left unchecked at the prison. Furthermore, since the US led an effort to prosecute its fellow soldiers for misconduct at Abu Ghraib, a likewise effort should be made to prosecute PMCs found guilty of crimes. PMCs function like soldiers; thus, they “are indeed responsible for the justice of the wars they fight in.”
48As illustrated by the Iraqi case, there must be basic oversight of PMCs to protect the rights of civilians. Just as US military personnel have been held accountable for their crimes in Iraq so to must PMCs be held accountable.
Policy Implications & Accountability
As the above two cases illustrated, there has been minimal monitoring and accountability of private military contractors. Executive Outcomes was left virtually free to conduct its business without any oversight. The Sierra Leone government or the United Nations for that matter did not dwell in to investigate whether the firm’s members had violated any human rights. The Organization of African Unity has in place legislative enforcements to monitor mercenaries under the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries, but it made no use of its powers during the Sierra Leone conflict.
49 Likewise, the United States government has made some of the most extensive use of PMCs in Iraq but just as recently as summer of 2006 has it made an attempt to monitor them. In light of these issues, it is important to survey where current international and state accountability lies in respect to private security firms.
International Level Accountability
The United Nations outlawed the use of mercenaries in 1977 under Article 47 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions.
50 As mentioned before, the United Nations does not provide civilian protection of mercenaries. By partaking into military force, mercenaries are subject to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
51 Nonetheless, although contractors are included under UN conventions, they are able to bypass its provisions because of the multitude of military services offered by PMCs. For example, because a contractor often does not engage in direct combat when they commit a human rights violation they argue that they doe not fall under the category of a mercenary.
52 In essence, since Article 47 overtly emphasis that the person must enter into force, it provides a gray area for the contractors who supply but do enter into force. Thus, it is essential that the United Nations adjust its legislative principles to include mercenaries of all kinds, not just those involved in force. International law must be receptive to the ever changing conditions of the new forces present in the international scene of conflict and war.
On a lighter note, there have been substantiate reports published by the United Nations’ Working Group, composed of a group of independent experts, on the damaging effects of mercenaries on state sovereignty and the preservation of human rights.
53 The content and advice offered by the Working Group present a better means to monitor PMCs today by highlighting the gray areas by which private security firms can escape legal accountability.
54 It also emphasizes the usual violations of human rights that PMCs commit. For one, it is noted that PMCs infringe on the right to security of persons, the rights of workers and respect for national sovereignty and human rights.
55 Upon such infringements, the Working Group seeks consultation with regional and state bodies to offer recommendations on oversight of PMCs.
56The Working Group of the United Nations may not hold the power to prosecute PMCs, but its detailed reports and methods of accruing more information about the activity of these mercenaries offer a mechanism by which to develop the necessary legislative enforcements to monitor them.
Regional Level Accountability
On a regional perspective, the Organization of African Union has taken one important legal measure to curb the power of mercenaries. It outlawed the use of mercenaries in 1977 in the Convention of the Elimination of Mercenaries.
57 As stated in the Convention, there is a concern that mercenaries place a “grave threat” to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state.
58 Additionally, Article 4 of the Convention poignantly recognizes that mercenaries are responsible for all crimes associated with mercenaries.
59 In other words, a private military contractor cannot escape punishment because they claim to be absent from direct combat by simply training or arming a state military. Under Article 4, the scope of criminality extends to all areas of their expertise.
60Furthermore, the Convention places obligation on states to hold their nationals accountable for participating in mercenary activity under Article 6.
61 Member states of OAU are to “take all necessary legislative and other measures to ensure the immediate entry into force” to prevent the recruitment or hiring of mercenaries.
62 And mercenaries are to be indicted under state federal jurisdiction consistent with Articles 7, 8 and 9.
63 The OAU’s Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries is a well-developed legal code that willing states could use in their indictment of private military contractors. It is far more elaborate than the United Nations Article 47 on clarifying the status of a mercenary and offers a much more detailed account of how to prosecute a mercenary. The Convention could become a stronger regional tool for monitoring mercenaries if only its respective state signatories would not employ the use of private security firms. It is not that there are not regional bodies that wish to have greater oversight over these firms. It is that states have not done enough to monitor them. Thus, accountability ultimately lies in a states decision to prosecute mercenaries using current regional and international law.
State Level Accountability
On July 2006 United States House Representative Jan Schakowsky won bi-partisan amendment to the defense bill that will monitor private military contractors. Representative Schakowsky poignantly recognized that since “private contractors serve side by side with our troops, and are paid with billions of US taxpayer dollars, the rules governing their conduct need to be clear, uniform and tough."
64 Under the Schakowsky amendment:
“The Inspector General reports on contractor overcharges, establish a background
check system for foreign nationals hired for work on US contracts, prevent contractors from hiring felons and human rights abusers, make retroactive 2005
contractor rules so that they cover all active contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
requires sufficient contractor oversight officers to review contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.”
65The passing of the Schakowsky amendment is paramount to the accountability of private military contractors because it directly attests that the state, at least in respect to the United States, has recognized that it is a government’s duty to monitor any security personnel it hires in its wars. Also, it establishes legislative means by which to hold them accountable. There is now the creation of an actual monitoring body that will track down their actions. Private security firms no longer will be faced with a laissez-faire attitude by states. Their actions will now bear consequences. Although the amendment is limited to dealing with mercenaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, it can eventually be extended to include all future contracted mercenaries.
Besides the Schakowsky Amendment, the United States can also hold private military contractors accountable for their crimes under federal law. Under the U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996, U.S. nationals who commit any grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions such as any violation of common article 3 are subject to a respective fine, imprisonment, or even the death penalty.
66 Since private contractors cannot be tried before a military court since they are not part of the state’s army, U.S. federal law functions as the next possible legal recourse.
Moreover, private contractors who are hired through the U.S. Defense Department can also be prosecuted under the Military Extrajudicial Jurisdiction Act known as MEJA, which allows any U.S. citizen who is employed for the armed forces abroad to face legislative accountability for their actions under federal civilian law
67.
Although MEJA entails accountability for contractors hired only through the U.S. Department of Defense, on June of 2004 MEJA lead a case against CIA contractor David Passaro for committing acts of torture in Afghanistan.
68 MEJA upheld the case under Title 18 section 7 of the US which extends federal jurisdiction to other military, diplomatic, or consular personal.
69 The United States vs. David A. Passaro case illustrates that private military contractors can be held accountability for violating human rights under state law.
Besides United States and OAU efforts to provide greater oversight of PMCs, South Africa has demonstrated to adopt some of the most restrictive measures on the contracting of private security. In 1998 South Africa led an impressive lead to stop all mercenary activity within its state jurisdiction. Under the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (FMAA), the state made it illegal to contract private military assistance and required the approval of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee to offer military assistance overseas.
70 These strict measures prevented any use of private security firms and eventually led to the demise of Executive Outcomes in 1999.
71Although South Africa takes the extreme case of eliminating all mercenary activity instead of just creating a monitoring force like in the United States, the case highlights that if a state has the power to shut down one of the most notorious private military contractors, Executive Outcomes, it has the power to hold them accountable for any violations of human rights.
Availing Lessons
Overall, the murky area that private security firms fall under must be eliminated for the continuing preservation of human rights. Transparency is key to ensure that PMCs are brought under international and domestic accountability. In terms of international law, the rise of private military contractors entails the redefinition of what constitutes a mercenary under Article 47 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions. It also requires that states hold private security firms responsible for the crimes that their employees commit. The African Unity already has in place laws dealing specifically with mercenaries under the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries.
72 And the United States, in light of the wide use of private military contractors in Iraq, has included the Schakowsky Amendment in the defense bill for tougher oversight of contractors.
73 Any state that is willing to employ the services of such a company should also bear the legislative capacity to hold them accountable.
Whether private military contractors are the answer to a depleting army or offer hope to a struggling state where the United Nations or other regional organizations will not intervene is just as central to examine as how accountability should be administered. The infiltration of this new phenomenon in the world stage requires the development of new legislative enforcements. Governments and the international community must work together to implement and enforce all the necessary provisions to monitor these firms. Otherwise, these soldiers of fortune will be left with an open-door policy to disregard fundamental human rights.
ENDNOTES
1 Deborah D. Avant. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 1).
2 “Private Military Contractors and the Law.” Human Rights Watch. 2003. 28 Oct. 2006. < http://hrw org/english/docs/2004/05/05/iraq8547.htm>.
3 Heirfried Munkler. “The Brutal Logic of Terror: the Privatization of War in Modernity.” Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory. 9 (March 2002), 66-73.
4 David Isenberg. “Combat for Sale: The New, Post-Cold War Mercenaries.” USA Today. (March 2000) , 12-16.
5 David Isenberg. Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms. (Washington, DC: Center for Defense, 1997: 3).
6 Deborah D. Avant. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security.
(United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 5).
7 Sellars, Kirsten. “Old Dogs of War Lean New Trick.” New Statesman (London, England). 126 (Apr 97), 24-25.
8 Tony Lynch and Andy Walsh. “The Good Mercenary.” Journal of Political Philosophy. 8 (June 2000), 135.
9 United Nations. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 12 August 1949. 16 Nov 2006. .
10 Laura Peterson. “Privatizing Combat: the New World Order”. Making a Killing. Oct. 28, 2006. .
11 United Nations. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. 8 June 1977. 15 No 2005. .
12 Ibid.
13 Laura Peterson. “Privatizing Combat: the New World Order”. Making a Killing. Oct. 28, 2006..
14 Peter W. Singer. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004).
15 Tony Lynch and Andy Walsh. “The Good Mercenary.” Journal of Political Philosophy. 8(2). June 2000: 133.
16 Deborah D. Avant. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 27).
17 Ibid 22.
18 Tony Lynch and Andy Walsh. “The Good Mercenary.” Journal of Political Philosophy. 8(2). June 2000: 143.
19 Elizabeth Ruben. “An Army of One’s Own.” Harper’s. 294 (Feb. 97), 44-55.
20 Greg Guma. “Private Military Corporations Enforce Globalization and US Policies.” Toward Freedom. 2006. <>.
21 Ibid 1.
22 David Isenberg. Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms. (Washington, DC: Center for Defense, 1997: 6).
23 Ibid 6.
24 Dena Montague. “The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs. 9 (Spring 2002, 233.
25 Elizabeth Ruben. “An Army of One’s Own.” Harper’s. 294 (Feb. 97), 44-55.
26 Dena Montague. “The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone.” The Brown Journal of World Affairs. 9 (Sping 2002), 233.
27 Ibid 234.
28 Deborah D. Avant. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 88).
29 Ibid 88.
30 David Isenberg. Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms. (Washington, DC: Center for Defense, 1997: 8).
31 Deborah D. Avant. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 90).
32 David Isenberg. Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms. (Washington, DC: Center for Defense, 1997: 8).
33 Ibid 8.
34 Deborah D. Avant. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 90).
35 Ibid 90.
36 William Solis. Rebuilding Iraq : Actions still needed to improve the use of private security providers : testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006: 2.
37 Jeremy Scahill. “Blood is Thicker than Blackwater.” The Nation. 8 May 2006. 10 Nov. 2006. <>.
38 Ibid.
39 Nick Robertson. “Iraq Contractors Make Billions on Front Line.” CNN. 12 June 2006.
.
40 Ibid.
41 Deborah D. Avant. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 188.
42 Spiegel, Peter. “US is Faulted for Using Private Military Workers.” Home Edition. 24 May 2006: A 26.
43 Christian T. Miller. “Private Security Contractors in Iraq Face Little Accountability if they Shoot.” LA Times. 5 December 2005. 25 Oct 2006. < http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/PrintStory.pl?document_id=2002665100&zsection_id=2002107549&slug=contractors05&date=20051205>.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 “AIUSA to Highlight Emerging Problems with Private Military Contractors During 2006 Annual Report Release.” US Newswire. 23 May 2006. 1 Nov. 2006. .
47 Ibid.
48 Joseph J. Miller. “Jus ad bellum and an Officer's Moral Obligations: Invincible
Ignorance, the Constitution, and Iraq.” Social Theory and Practice: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy. 30(4.) October 2004: 458.
49 Organization of African Unity. OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (CM/187). July 1997. < http://www.africaunion.org/root/AU/Documents/ Treaties/ Text/ Convention_on_Mercenaries.pdf>.
50 United Nations. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. 8 June 1977. 15 No 2005. .
51 Laura Peterson. “Privatizing Combat: the New World Order”. Making a Killing. Oct. 28, 2006..
52 Ibid.
53 United Nations. Economic and Social Council.62nd Sess. Commission on Human Rights, Item 5 of the Provisional Agenda. The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and Its Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation (E/CN.4/2006/11/Add.1). 3 March 2006. Official Record (2006). 17 Nov 2006.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Organization of African Unity. Convention of the OAU for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. 3July 1977. 11 Nov 2006. .
58 Organization of African Unity. OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (CM/187). July 1997. < http://www.africaunion.org/root/AU/Documents/ Treaties/ Text/ Convention_on_Mercenaries.pdf>.
59 Ibid 3.
60 Ibid 3.
61 Ibid 4.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid 5, 6.
64 From Lexis-Nexus Database “Rep. Schakowsky Calls for Contractor Accountability.” US Fed News. 13 June 2006.
65 Ibid.
66 “Private Military Contractors and the Law.” Human Rights Watch. 24 Oct. 2004. 28 Oct. 2006. < http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/05/iraq8547.htm >.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 “The Private Military Perspective.” House of Commons. August 2002. 1 Nov 2006. .
71 Ibid.
72 David Isenberg. Soldiers of Fortune Ltd.: A Profile of Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms. (Washington, DC: Center for Defense, 1997: 3).
73 From Lexis-Nexus Database “Rep. Schakowsky Calls for Contractor Accountability.” US Fed News. 13 June 2006. 
